Contents

Badge Personalization

After the Badge has been created as described above, it contains an encrypted contact data reference (enc_contact_data_ref). This reference is conceptually very similar to the contact data reference used by the Guest App. However, at this point there is no contact data associated to the reference, yet. Guests need to personalize their Badge using the Badge Personalization Frontend.

Overview

Participants

Components/Assets

Preconditions

Postconditions

Process

The Badge Personalization Frontend requires the badge serial number and the Guest’s Contact Data. It creates the encrypted guest data as follows:

# pseudocode

# derive the initial keying material from the serial number
seed = argon2id(entropy, salt="da3ae5ecd280924e",
                length=16, memorySize=32MiB, iterations=11, parallelism=1)

# derive secrets analogously to the Badge Generation process
level_one     = HKDF-HMAC-SHA256(seed, length=64,
                                 context="badge_crypto_assets",
                                 salt="")
data_secret   = level_one[0:16]
tracing_seed  = level_one[16:32]
guest_keypair = level_one[32:64]

level_two = HKDF-HMAC-SHA256(tracing_seed, length=48,
                             context="badge_tracing_assets",
                             salt="")

user_id                = toUuid4(level_two[0:16])
badge_verification_key = level_two[16:32]
# tracing_secret is not required in this process

# derive the symmetric encryption key from the data secret
# this key directly corresponds to the data_encryption_key used by the Guest App
data_encryption_key = SHA256(data secret || 0x01) # truncated to 16 bytes

# encrypt contact_data and badge_verification_key analogously to how the Guest
# App creates the encrypted_guest_data
# the badge_verification_key corresponds to the data_authentication_key

iv = random_bytes(16)

encrypted_guest_data = AES_128(contact_data + badge_verification_key,
                               key=data_encryption_key,
                               mode=CTR,
                               iv=iv)

badge_data_mac = HMAC(encrypted_guest_data,
                      key=badge_verification_key)

badge_data_signature = guest_keypair.private.sign(encrypted_guest_data +
                                                  badge_verification_key +
                                                  iv)

The Badge Personalization Frontend sends the following data to the Luca Server:

  • the encrypted guest data

  • the IV used in the encryption

  • the badge data mac

  • the badge data signature

The Luca Server verifies that the request is authorized by checking the provided signature with public key that was uploaded when the Badge was generated.